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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen**
Katherine D. Dixon...
and
Marion H. Martin***
I.

LEGISLATION

The 2003 Georgia General Assembly made minimal amendments to
the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act").'
It has long been a fundamental tenet of Georgia's workers' compensation system that employees are required to accept authorized medical
treatment.2 Likewise, a similar requirement to cooperate is found in the
provisions allowing an employer to obtain an independent medical
evaluation.' The procedures for enforcing this requirement were more
well-defined for independent medical evaluations because non-cooperation was much more frequent in that area. Therefore, the procedures
regarding employee cooperation with authorized medical treatment were
modified to copy the procedures regarding employee cooperation with
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1. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
2. Id. § 34-9-200(c).
3. Id. § 34-9-202.
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independent medical evaluations.4 If the employee refuses to submit or
in any way obstructs an examination by the authorized treating
physician, the employee's right to compensation "shall" be suspended
upon order of the board, unless, in the opinion of the board, the
circumstances justify the employee's refusal.5
No issue is more controversial in Georgia's workers' compensation
system than the definition of "catastrophic injury" found in O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-200.1(g)(6). 6 Frequently referred to as the "safety net"
catastrophic category, the provision includes in the definition of
"catastrophic injury" any injury "of a nature and severity that prevents
the employee from being able to perform his or her prior work and any
work available in substantial numbers within the national economy for
which such employee is otherwise qualified."7
It also allows for
consideration of decisions granting or denying disability income benefits
under the Social Security Act.8 To clarify that the social security
decision does not create a presumption, the code section was modified to
state that "no presumption shall be created by any decision granting or
denying disability income benefits under Title II or supplementary
security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act."9
Historically, there has not been a statute of limitations on medical
expenses for claims in which compensability has been accepted under the
Workers' Compensation Act.1 ° Implementing what appears to be more
of a waiver than a statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-203(c)
was modified to add the following language as a fourth subsection:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subsection, if the
employee or the provider of health care goods or services fails to submit
its charges to the employer or its workers' compensation insurer within
one year of the date of service of the issuance of such goods or services,
then the provider is deemed to have waived its right to collect such
charges from the employer, its workers' compensation insurer, and the
employee.11
The new code section neither measures the time period from the date
of service until a claim or cause of action is filed, nor requires affirma-

4. Id.
5. Id. § 34-9-200(c).
6. Id. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6).
7. Id.
8. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 to -1397jj (2000).
9. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
10. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 152 Ga. App. 600, 600, 263 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1997);
O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
11. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c)(4).
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tive attempts to institute a claim within a specific period of time.
Instead, the right of the employee or any provider of healthcare goods or
services to file a claim simply expires and is waived if the charges are
not submitted to the employer or its workers' compensation insurer
within one year from the date of service. 12 The new code section does
not define the threshold issue of how charges may be submitted.
Finally, the cap on temporary total disability benefits was raised from
$400 per week to $425 per week, 13 and the cap on temporary partial
14
disability benefits was raised from $268 per week to $284 per week.
II.

ATTORNEY FEES

During this survey period, two appellate cases dealt with the board's
broad authority to assess attorney fees against a party. In Seabolt v.
Beaulieu of America,'5 the court of appeals granted discretionary review
to consider whether the appellate division could assess attorney fees in
16
its award, even though the administrative law judge ("AL") did not.
The employee, Dockrey, requested a hearing seeking income benefits and
medical treatment. She also sought attorney fees for an alleged
unreasonable defense of her claims.17 After an evidentiary hearing, the
ALJ denied Dockrey's claim for income benefits, concluding that Dockrey
was terminated from her employment for reasons unrelated to her onthe-job injury and that she failed to carry her Maloney burden.'"
However, the ALJ ordered the employer/insurer to pay for medical
treatment Dockrey received and to provide ongoing medical treatment
to her. The award was completely silent as to the assessment of
attorney fees against the employer/insurer. 9
On appeal to the appellate division of the State Board of Workers'
Compensation, Dockrey was awarded attorney fees. The appellate
division assessed attorney fees on the ground that the employer/insurer
unreasonably defended the request for medical treatment pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108(b). 20 The superior court affirmed all of the
findings of the board except the appellate division's assessment of

12. Id.
13. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
14. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-266 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
15. 255 Ga. App. 750, 566 S.E.2d 444 (2002).
16. Id. at 750, 566 S.E.2d at 444.
17. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 445.
18. Id. at 751, 566 S.E.2d at 445; see Maloney v. Gordon County Farms, 265 Ga. 825,
462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
19. 255 Ga. App. at 751, 566 S.E.2d at 445.
20. Id. at 751-52, 566 S.E.2d at 445-46; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
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attorney fees. 2' It reasoned that the absence of any discussion by the
ALJ about attorney fees "could be an oversight or could be an implicit
denial of them."2 2 Because the superior court could not determine the
ALJ's intent, the court remanded the case to the board for clarification
by the ALJ on the attorney fee issue.23
The court of appeals reversed.24 It cited O.C.G.A. section 34-9108(b),25 which states: "Upon a determination that proceedings have
been brought, prosecuted, or defended in whole or in part without
reasonable grounds, the administrative law judge or the board may
assess the adverse attorney's fee against the offending party."2" Thus,
the appellate division has power to assess attorney fees for the
unreasonable prosecution or defense of a claim even when the administrative law judge did not assess attorney fees.27
In the second case regarding assessed attorney fees, Milliken & Co. v.
Poythress," the court of appeals again held that the superior court
erroneously reversed an award of attorney fees by the board.2 9
Poythress was a bale press operator who first complained of neck, arm,
and wrist problems to his supervisor in March 1997. He did not seek
workers' compensation income benefits or medical treatment until
October 1999, when the employer's human resources department sent
him to a panel physician. In April 2000, the employee's problem was
definitively diagnosed, and the treating physician determined that he
was disabled. He requested light duty work from the employer, but none
was available. The employer denied that the claim was compensable but
did not actually file a WC-1 form controverting the claim until the date
of the hearing before the AL.'
At the hearing, the ALJ held that the employee's problems were
related to his employment and thus awarded income and medical
benefits.3" The AJ found that assessed attorney fees were appropriate
because the claim had been defended, "at least in part, after medical
evidence demonstrated an injury arose out of and in the course of the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

255 Ga. App. at 751-52, 566 S.E.2d at 445-46.
Id.
Id. at 753, 566 S.E.2d at 446-47.
Id. at 753, 566 S.E.2d at 447.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
255 Ga. App. at 752, 566 S.E.2d at 446.
Id.
257 Ga. App. 586, 571 S.E.2d 569 (2002).
Id. at 588-89, 571 S.E.2d at 571.
Id. at 587, 571 S.E.2d at 570-71.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 570.
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employment and benefits should have been then provided."32 The ALJ
further stated that assessed attorney fees were appropriate because the
employer/insurer had not timely filed the WC-1. 3
Although the
superior court affirmed the board's finding as to compensability of the
claim, it reversed the finding as to attorney fees, stating, "there is not
sufficient competent evidence in the record that the defense of such
claims was unreasonable and
the ruling otherwise is contrary to law and
34
the evidence in the record."
In reinstating the board's assessment of attorney fees, the court of
appeals referred to the mandatory nature of the WC-1 and the specific
timing requirements for its filing:3 5 "[O.C.G.A. section] 34-9-221(d)
provides: 'If the employer controverts the right to compensation, it shall
file with the board, on or before the twenty-first day after knowledge of
the alleged injury or death, a [WC-1] notice. . . stating that the right of
compensation is controverted.'"3
The court then quoted O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-108(b)(2), 37 regarding the assessment of attorney fees:
"Ifany provision of Code Section 34-9-22 1, without reasonable grounds,
is not complied with and a claimant engages the services of an attorney
to enforce his or her rights under that Code section and the claimant
prevails, the reasonable quantum meruit fee of the attorney, as
determined by the board, and the costs of the proceedings may be
assessed against the employer."3
It was undisputed that the employer knew of Poythress's injury by
October 1999, at the latest, when the employer sent him to a panel
doctor.39 It was likewise undisputed that the employer/insurer had not
filed the WC-1 until the hearing, and that it had no explanation for its
failure to file within the requisite twenty-one days.4" Consequently, the
court held that the board was well within its authority to find that the

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 257 Ga. App. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(d)).
37. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(2) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
38. 257 Ga. App. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(2)). The
court also cited Board Rule 221(d), which states, "'Failure to file the Form WC-1... before
the 21st day after knowledge of the injury ... may subject the employer/insurer to an
assessment of penalties or attorney's fees.'" Id. (quoting Rules and Regulations of the
State Board of Workers' Compensation Rule 221(d)).
39. Id. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 571.
40. Id.
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employer/insurer's non-compliance was unreasonable and that the
assessed attorney fees were appropriate. 4'
III.

CATASTROPHIC DESIGNATION

42
In Jered Industries, Inc. v. Pearson,
the court of appeals addressed
the board's authority to make a determination that a claim is catastrophic, as well as the superior court's role in reviewing the determination on appeal.4 3 Pearson suffered a compensable back injury in 1994
and underwent three surgeries. Although he attempted to return to
work at light duty, he was forced to stop working after three weeks due
to pain. Pearson's treating physician, Dr. Gold, opined that Pearson was
permanently and totally disabled. Based upon this statement, Pearson
applied for and received Social Security Disability Income ("SSDI")
benefits. Pearson then requested rehabilitation services. The employer/insurer disputed that Pearson's injury was catastrophic under the
Workers' Compensation Act and therefore disputed its obligation to
provide rehabilitation services.44
Prior to the hearing, the employer/insurer required Pearson to undergo
a functional capacities examination ("FCE"). The physician who
conducted the FCE concluded that Pearson was unable to return to his
former employment as an assembly worker, but that he, nevertheless,
was capable of performing sedentary work. Revising his prior statement
of permanent total disability, Dr. Gold deferred to the FCE physician's
assessment and agreed that Pearson was capable of light duty work.
Based upon the above evidence, the AIJ held that Pearson's injury was
not catastrophic under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200. 1.4
The board's
appellate division agreed. However, the superior court reversed,46 and
the court of appeals granted the employer/insurer's application for
discretionary appeal.4 7
The court first cited the rule that appellate courts in a workers'
compensation appeal "are required to construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party prevailing before the State Board."4' The
court then referred to the definition of catastrophic injury set forth in

41. Id.
42. 261 Ga. App. 373, 582 S.E.2d 522 (2003).
43. Id. at 373, 582 S.E.2d at 522.
44. Id. at 373-74, 582 S.E.2d at 522-23.
45. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
46. 261 Ga. App. at 373, 582 S.E.2d at 522.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Poythress, 257 Ga. App. 586, 571 S.E.2d 569).
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O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1(g):49 "[A] catastrophic injury is defined as
'aninjury of a nature and severity as has qualified or would qualify an
employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II or supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security

Act.' "5
Finally, the court noted the Georgia Supreme Court's 1999 ruling in
Cobb County School District v. Barker5 that an award of social security
benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that an injury is catastrophic
and that whether the presumption has been rebutted is a question of
fact for the board.52 The evidence presented showed that Pearson was
capable of performing at least sedentary work. 53
Therefore, the
superior court should have affirmed the board's finding that Pearson's
injury was not catastrophic, in accordance with the "any evidence"
rule.54
IV.

THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY

The exclusive remedy is the linch pin of the Workers' Compensation
Act,55 and it has been discussed in detail in prior surveys.5 6 This
survey period marked a continuation of efforts to attack the exclusive
remedy.
For example, in Satilla Community Service Board v. Satilla Health
Services, Inc.,57 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed a novel concept
called an "identical reciprocal implied contractual indemnification,""8
which the court of appeals held created an implied contractual duty to
indemnify, thus avoiding the workers' compensation exclusive remedy

49. Id. at 374, 582 S.E.2d at 523; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
50. 261 Ga. App. at 374, 582 S.E.2d at 523 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6)).
51. 271 Ga. 35, 518 S.E.2d 126 (1999).
52. 261 Ga. App. at 374, 582 S.E.2d at 523.
53. Id. at 375, 582 S.E.2d at 523-24.
54. Id. at 374-75, 582 S.E.2d at 523. The "any evidence" rule states that if the board's
findings are supported by any evidence, they are conclusive and binding upon the superior
court. See WAGA-TV, Inc. v. Yang, 256 Ga. App. 224, 227, 569 S.E.2d 58, 61 (1999).
55. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
56. For overviews of the exclusive remedy doctrine in Georgia, see H. Michael Bagley
et al., Workers' Compensation, 50 MERCER L. REV. 401 (1998); H. Michael Bagley et al.,
Workers' Compensation,51 MERCER L. REV. 549 (1999); H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers'
Compensation,52 MERCER L. REV. 505 (2000); H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 53 MERCER L. REV. 521 (2001); and H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 54 MERCER L. REV. 617 (2002).
57. 275 Ga. 805, 573 S.E.2d 31 (2002).
58. Id. at 805, 573 S.E.2d at 31.
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bar.59 In this case, Patricia Fields killed Marie Rowell, an employee of
the Satilla Community Service Board. Fields was a mental health
patient of Dr. John Michaels and of Satilla Health Services, Inc. ("SHS").
Rowell's estate and child sued the guardian of Fields's property for
wrongful death. The guardian of Fields's property filed a third-party
claim against SHS and Dr. Michaels, alleging that Michaels was
negligent and that SHS was responsible for Michaels's negligence under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. SHS and Dr. Michaels in turn sued
the Satilla Community Services Board as a fourth-party defendant.
They claimed negligence, breach of contract between the Satilla
Community Services Board and SHS, and a right to contractual
indemnification. The guardian of Fields's property then contended that
Fields was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Satilla
Community Services Board and SHS. The trial court denied Satilla
Community Services Board's motion for summary judgment. The court
of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the Satilla
Community Services Board was entitled to summary judgment on the
negligence claims but not on the contract claims.6 °
In examining whether the trial court also should have granted
summary judgment to Satilla Community Services Board on the contract
claims, the supreme court noted that one of the fundamental tenets of
the exclusive remedy doctrine is:
An employer who has paid workers' compensation to one of its
employees is immune from liability for claims of contribution and
indemnification arising from that employee's tort action, unless there
is a contractual, statutory, or special relationship between the employer
and the third-party that would require contribution or indemnification.6 '
The supreme court noted that the contract between Satilla Community
Services Board and SHS did not expressly require Satilla Community
Services Board to indemnify either SHS or Dr. Michaels. 62 Instead, the
contract required SHS to indemnify Satilla Community Services Board
without requiring the Board to reciprocate.63 Notwithstanding that the

59. See Satilla Cmty. Serv. Bd. v. Satilla Health Servs., 251 Ga. App. 881, 555 S.E.2d
188 (2001); see also H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 54 MERCER L. REV.
623-24 (2002).
60. 275 Ga. at 806, 573 S.E.2d at 32.
61. Id.; see Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Constr. Co., 270 Ga. 464, 465,
511 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1999); Sargent Indus., Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 251 Ga. 91, 92, 303
S.E.2d 108, 109 (1983).
62. 275 Ga. at 807, 573 S.E.2d at 33.
63. Id.
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contract between the parties specifically addressed indemnification
obligations, the court of appeals held that the Board had an implied duty
to indemnify SHS and Dr. Michaels under6 4a theory it labeled "identical
reciprocal implied contractual indemnity."
However, the supreme court noted that there was no authority in
Georgia law that would have created such an implied obligation to
indemnify. 5 Therefore, because the Board had neither an express nor
an implied contractual duty to indemnify, the workers' compensation
exclusive remedy doctrine barred the claims for indemnification against
the Board, and the trial court should have granted the Board's motion
for summary judgment.66 Likewise, the claim brought on behalf of the
guardian of Fields's property should have been dismissed because the
workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision rendered the Board
immune from secondary liability.67 The supreme court stated:
In summary, the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision
bars the claims against the Board to the extent those claims seek to
hold the Board secondarily liable. Because the Board was not made a
party to this action based upon a viable claim for secondary liability,
any claims for direct liability cannot be brought .. 6
Another novel attempt to circumvent the exclusive remedy doctrine is
found in Brooks-Powers v. MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid Transit Authority,69 in which the spouse of a deceased employee relied heavily upon the
Urban Mass Transportation Act7 ° and the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution in her efforts to avoid the exclusive remedy
doctrine. Jean Brooks-Powers was the sole surviving spouse and
administratrix of the estate of John Walter Powers, who was killed in a
work-related accident. Brooks-Powers filed for and received dependency
and death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act from the
She
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA"). 71
subsequently brought a civil action seeking damages as a result of
MARTA's alleged failure to comply with security and safety policies,
provisions, and regulations of the Urban Mass Transit Act.72 Brooks-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 808, 573 S.E.2d at 33.
260 Ga. App. 390, 579 S.E.2d 802 (2003).
49 U.S.C. §§ 5329, 5330 (2000).
260 Ga. App. at 391, 579 S.E.2d at 804.
Id.; 49 U.S.C. §§ 5329, 5330 (2000).
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Powers also relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 72 asserting that her husband's
constitutional rights were violated when he was deprived of a substantive due process right to a safe working environment as required by the
Urban Mass Transit Act.74
The trial court granted summary judgment to MARTA. 7' Affirming
the trial court, the court of appeals noted that none of the cases BrooksPowers relied on involved a conflict between the Urban Mass Transit Act
and state law.76 The court noted that a plaintiff asserting the existence
of an implied right of action bears the burden of establishing that
position, and Brooks-Powers had not cited a provision of the Urban Mass
Transit Act showing that Congress expressly intended to preempt the
state workers' compensation laws and authorize an injured worker or his
heirs to file a private right of action.17 Unlike the Federal Employers
Liability Act,78 in which Congress superseded state law remedies so
that the Federal Employers Liability Act provided the exclusive remedy
for the employees of common carriers injured by the negligence of their
employers, there is no evidence creating the inference that Congress
intended to do the same under the Urban Mass Transit Act.79 Finally,
neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Georgia Supreme
Court recognized the independent substantive due process right to a safe
working environment separate from and beyond the framework of
workers' compensation laws. ° The court found no authority to support
Brooks-Powers's claim that a government employer has a duty to provide
its employees with a safe working environment as a substantive
component of the Due Process Clause.8 '
In Coker v. Deep South Surplus, Inc.,2 the court of appeals held that
the target defendant was outside the parameters of the Workers'
Compensation Act, and the exclusive remedy doctrine did not apply.8 3
Coker was an employee of Mayo Company and was using a hydraulic

73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
74. 260 Ga. App. at 391, 579 S.E.2d at 804.
75. Id. at 390, 579 S.E.2d at 804.
76. Id. at 392, 579 S.E.2d at 805; see Area Transp., Inc. v. Ettinger, 75 F. Supp. 2d 862
(N.D. Ill. 1999); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Stavisky
v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 533 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
77. 260 Ga. App. at 392, 579 S.E.2d at 805.
78. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
79. 260 Ga. App. at 394, 579 S.E.2d at 806.
80. Id. at 395, 579 S.E.2d at 806-07; see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115
(1992); S. Wire & Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962).
81. 260 Ga. App. at 396, 579 S.E.2d at 807.
82. 258 Ga. App. 755, 574 S.E.2d 815 (2002).
83. Id. at 757, 574 S.E.2d at 817.
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shearing machine to cut metal sheets when the fingers on both of his
hands were amputated. Coker brought a civil action against Deep South
Surplus of Georgia, Inc. ("Deep South"), alleging that Deep South
negligently conducted safety inspections of Mayo's premises prior to the
incident. The trial court granted Deep South summary judgment on the
ground that it inspected the premises as part of Mayo's compensation
program and therefore was immune from the lawsuit under the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.84 The court of
appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment, noting that Deep
South was not the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier
and did not have a contract with the employer to provide workers'
compensation benefits to injured employees.8 5 While noting that the
parameters of the Workers' Compensation Act specifically extend to the
employer's workers' compensation insurance carriers,8 6 the court of
appeals strictly construed the statute and found that the immunity
provisions did not extend to Deep South.8
In doing so, the court of appeals distinguished several earlier cases,
which held that service agencies performing safety inspections are
entitled to the same tort immunity as the employer and the workers'
compensation carrier.8 In Mull v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,89 the
court held that any representative of an employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier making safety inspections on behalf of the carrier
is considered an "alter ego" of the employer and immune to any tort
action.9" The court in Coker distinguished Mull because at the time of
the decision in Mull, the Workers' Compensation Act did not contain the
current immunity provision.9 1 Similarly, the court distinguished Fred
S. James & Co. v. King92 and Hinkley v. Building Material Merchants
Ass'n93 as having fundamentally different factual scenarios because the
employers involved in both of those cases were self-insured for purposes
of workers' compensation.94 However, in a lengthy dissent, Chief Judge

84. Id. at 755, 574 S.E.2d at 817.
85. Id. at 757, 574 S.E.2d at 817.
86. Id. at 755-56, 574 S.E.2d at 816-17; see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
87. 258 Ga. App. at 755-56, 574 S.E.2d at 816-17.
88. Id. at 756-57, 574 S.E.2d at 817; see Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 120 Ga. App.
791, 172 S.E.2d 147 (1969); Fred S. James & Co. v. King, 160 Ga. App. 697, 288 S.E.2d 52
(1981); Hinkley v. Bldg. Material Merchs. Ass'n, 187 Ga. App. 345, 370 S.E.2d 201 (1988).
89. 120 Ga. App. 791, 172 S.E.2d 147 (1969).
90. Id. at 791, 172 S.E.2d at 147.
91. 258 Ga. App. at 756, 574 S.E.2d at 817.
92. 160 Ga. App. 697, 288 S.E.2d 52 (1981).
93. 187 Ga. App. 345, 370 S.E.2d 201 (1988).
94. 258 Ga. App. at 756-57, 574 S.E.2d at 817.
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Blackburn pointed out that whether one applies the "any representative"
standard of Mull or the "any person" standard of O.C.G.A. section 34-911(a), 95 Deep South should have been entitled to immunity because it
was uncontroverted that Deep South had an agreement with the
insurance carrier of Coker's employer to provide certain workers'
compensation benefits, including administering the workers' compensation program and conducting safety inspections. 96
The court of appeals analyzed the "construction design professional"
exception to the exclusive remedy in Cowart v. Crown American
Properties.97 An employee of a Chick-Fil-A restaurant fell from a
ladder used by employees as a passageway to the restaurant's mezzanine
level. The employee filed a tort action against Chick-Fil-A as well as the
owner and operator of the building where the restaurant was located.
Under the lease agreement between the building owner and Chick-Fil-A,
Chick-Fil-A was responsible for the design and construction of the
restaurant's interior improvements, including the ladder, although the
building owner reserved the right to approve construction plans and
specifications. Chick-Fil-A retained a licensed architectural firm to
prepare the plans and specifications, including the ladder. Testimony
was presented that Chick-Fil-A did not direct or control the architectural
firm's work and relied on it to design the ladder in a manner that would
comply with all code requirements.9" Under the express terms of
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11(a), 99 the immunity granted to construction
design professionals "shall not apply to the negligent preparation of
design plans and specifications." 100 The injured employee argued that
Chick-Fil-A should have been deprived of its tort immunity because it
was acting as a construction design professional. The trial court found
no merit to this argument, 01 and the court of appeals agreed, noting
that:
"'construction design professional' means any person who is an
architect, professional engineer, landscape architect, geologist, or land
surveyor who has been issued a license pursuant to Chapter 4, 15, 19,
or 23 of Title 43 or any corporation organized to render professional
services in Georgia through the practice of one of more such technical
professions as architecture, professional engineering, landscape

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

O.C.G.A. § 34-4-11(a) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
258 Ga. App. at 758, 574 S.E.2d at 818 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
258 Ga. App. 21, 22, 572 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2002).
Id. at 21-22, 572 S.E.2d at 707-08.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
258 Ga. App. at 22, 572 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a)).
Id. at 22, 23, 572 S.E.2d at 708, 709.
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architecture, geology, or land surveying." Clearly, Chick-Fil-A does not
fall within this definition.0 2
The court of appeals also rejected the argument that Chick-Fil-A
assumed construction design duties unrelated to its status as an
employer and should be subjected to civil liability under the "dual
persona doctrine."10 3 Under that doctrine, an employer may have tort
liability to an employee if the employer "possesses a second persona so
completely independent from and unrelated to his status as employer
that by established standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal
person." 4 The court held that Chick-Fil-A's approval of the plans and
specifications for construction and design were insufficient to show10 5a
separate legal persona that would invoke the dual persona doctrine.
Ridley v. Monroe0 6 concerned a unique situation in which an
employee brought a civil action against a coworker after settling a
workers' compensation claim with the employer, which included the
stipulation that the original accident was "not compensable under the
Georgia Workers' Compensation Law."0 7 The employee argued that
this settlement stipulation meant that her claim could not fall within the
Workers' Compensation Act and the exclusive remedy provision would
not bar her suit against a coworker. The trial court rejected the
employee's argument, concluding that by pursuing and settling the
workers' compensation claim, she brought herself within the Act and its
exclusive remedy. °s The court of appeals agreed, noting that the
Workers' Compensation Act specifically permits parties to settle claims
by stipulating "no liability."' 09
Nothing in the Act removes such
settlement agreements from the Act's exclusive remedy provision, and
the court noted that "[p]ermitting parties to circumvent the Act's
exclusive remedy restriction simply by settling a claim on a 'no-liability'
basis undermines [the] purpose [of the Act] and eviscerates a legislative
scheme in which the sole remedy lies against the employer."10

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 23, 572 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(b) (1998 & Supp. 2003)).
Id.
Id.; see Porter v. Beloit Corp., 194 Ga. App. 591, 391 S.E.2d 430 (1990).
258 Ga. App. at 23, 572 S.E.2d at 709.
256 Ga. App. 686, 569 S.E.2d 561 (2002).
Id. at 686, 569 S.E.2d at 562.
Id. at 687, 569 S.E.2d at 562.
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15 (1998 & Supp. 2003)
256 Ga. App. at 688, 569 S.E.2d at 563.
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HEARING NOTICE

American Mobile Imaging, Inc. v. Miles... dealt with the sufficiency
of notice to the parties to a workers' compensation claim. 1 2 Both sides
of the workers' compensation bar should take particular note of this
decision. In Miles a hearing was held before the board at the employee's
request. Neither the employer nor the insurer appeared, and a ruling
was entered awarding the employee benefits. Once the employer/insurer
learned of the award, the employer filed a motion with the superior court
to set aside the board's award on the grounds that they did not receive
proper notice of the employee's request for the hearing, or of the hearing
itself, and that this lack of notice was a non-amendable defect. The
superior court denied the employer/insurer's motion to set aside the
award, and the case was taken up on appeal. 13
The court of appeals held that there was sufficient legal notice to both
the employer and the insurer.'
Although employees of both the
employer and the insurer swore that they never actually received any
notice, the evidence showed-and it was not disputed-that the board
mailed the notices to the employer's and insurer's correct addresses via
regular mail." 5 The relevant code section, O.C.G.A. section 34-9102(i), 6 not only requires employers to maintain a current address
with the board, but also provides that "[any notice required by this
chapter shall be satisfied by the mailing of the notice to the address of
record."'
The court went on to state, "[sluch statute, which focuses
on the mailing of notice rather than actual receipt, does not violate due
process."118 Moreover, the court noted that there is no requirement in
the statute that the notice be sent via certified mail, only that it be
mailed." 9 Thus, the notice requirement to a party is satisfied simply
by mailing the notice to the party's address of record with the board. 2 °
The employer/insurer also argued that notice was insufficient because
the notice was not mailed to the employer, who was not a Georgia
resident, via certified mail, as required by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

260 Ga. App. 877, 581 S.E.2d 396 (2003).
Id. at 887, 581 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 877-78, 581 S.E.2d at 397-98.
Id. at 879, 581 S.E.2d at 398.
Id. at 877, 581 S.E.2d at 397.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(i) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
260 Ga. App. at 878, 581 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(i)).
Id. (citing Dillard v. Denson, 243 Ga. App. 458, 461, 533 S.E.2d 101, 104 (2000)).
Id., 581 S.E.2d at 397-98.
Id.
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102(j)(3).1 2 ' The court of appeals also rejected this argument. 122 The
court stated, "notice to either the employer or the insurer serves as
notice to the other."1 23 Because the insurer was a Georgia resident,
sending the hearing notice via regular mail to the insurer was sufficient
notice for both the employer and the insurer. 2 4 In addition to reaffirming the sufficiency of notice to the parties, Miles also highlights the
importance of an employer and insurer maintaining open lines of
communication in all aspects of a workers' compensation claim,
especially when a notice of claim is filed or a hearing is requested.
VI.

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

In Augusta Coca-Cola v. Smalls, 2' the court of appeals reiterated
that certain decisions of the appellate division are not appealable
because those decisions are not final decisions granting or denying
compensation.' 26 In Smalls the employee acted pro se. He requested
a hearing, but the employer and insurer moved to dismiss his claims
based on res judicata, and the ALJ agreed. The claim was dismissed
with prejudice. The employee appealed, and the appellate division
issued an127 order reversing the ALJ and directing the ALJ to conduct a
hearing.
The employer and insurer appealed to the superior court, which
affirmed the appellate division's order. The employer and insurer then
appealed to the court of appeals, 28 which concluded that the employer
and insurer should not have even been allowed to appeal to superior
court because their appeal was an interlocutory appeal not authorized
by the Workers' Compensation Act. 29 The Act makes no provision for
an appeal to the superior court from a decision by the
appellate division
30
unless the decision grants or denies compensation.

121. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(j)(3) (1998 & Supp. 2003). This code section provides,
"The executive director or his designated agent shall .. . send a copy of the notice or
process by certified mail to the last known address of the nonresident party." Id.
122. 260 Ga. App. at 878, 581 S.E.2d at 398.
123. Id. at 879, 581 S.E.2d at 398 (citing Royal Globe Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 123 Ga.
App. 268, 180 S.E.2d 576 (1971)).
124. Id.
125. 260 Ga. App. 465, 579 S.E.2d 873 (2003).
126. Id. at 465-66, 579 S.E.2d at 874.
127. Id. at 465, 579 S.E.2d at 874.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 465-66, 579 S.E.2d at 874.
130. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103.
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JOINT EMPLOYMENT

Georgia law has long recognized that coverage under the Workers'
Compensation Act for some employees should extend beyond regular
working hours, such as for traveling salesmen and law enforcement
personnel.' 3 ' Two decisions of the court of appeals, Harris County
Sheriff's Office v. Negretel3" and Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v.
Stevens, 3 ' have further defined the broad scope of employment for law
enforcement employees.
In Negrete a sheriff's deputy was seriously injured at 11:00 p.m. on a
Sunday evening, while off duty and while driving to his part-time job as
a security guard at a manufacturing plant. Although he was off duty
and not engaged in any active police work at the time of the accident,
Negrete was in his sheriff deputy's uniform and in a sheriff's patrol car
in accordance with a departmental policy, which permitted him to use
the vehicle for transportation to and from his job. Negrete was also
required to radio the sheriff's department dispatcher when he was using
the county vehicle, and at that point was subject to respond to radio
calls, render aid to motorists, respond to emergencies, and be on the
lookout for suspicious or criminal behavior. 34 The Harris County
Sheriff testified that while Negrete was using a patrol car under the
department's off-duty policy, "there was no meaningful difference
between [his] duty while on regular patrol and while returning home
from a part-time job." 35
Acknowledging that "there is no significant body of law specifically
addressed to the peculiar issues arising from the presumably broader
scope of employment connected with law enforcement," 36 the court of
appeals nevertheless held that Negrete's case was controlled by Barge
v. City of College Park,131 in which benefits were awarded to the widow
of an officer killed under mysterious circumstances while on the way to
work.'38 The court in Negrete held that "the crux of the matter is the
factual finding of the ALJ and appellate division that the deputy was

131. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thornton, 71 Ga. App. 486, 31 S.E.2d 115
(1944), rev'd, 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945).
132. 259 Ga. App. 891, 578 S.E.2d 579 (2003).
133. 261 Ga. App. 694, 583 S.E.2d 553 (2003).
134. 259 Ga. App. at 891-92, 578 S.E.2d at 580.
135. Id. at 892, 578 S.E.2d at 580.
136. Id. at 893, 578 S.E.2d at 581.
137. 148 Ga. App. 480, 251 S.E.2d 580 (1978).
138. Negrete, 259 Ga. App. at 892-93, 578 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Barge, 148 Ga. App. at
480, 251 S.E.2d at 580).
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conducting a law enforcement function at the time of the collision, that
function being the active patrol of his route to the location of his parttime job."'39
Shortly after the decision in Negrete, the court of appeals reached a
similar result in Stevens. 40 Stevens, a City of Savannah police officer,
was injured while driving her personal vehicle to work. At the time of
the accident, Stevens was a block away from her precinct, was in
uniform and armed, and was carrying her radio. As with Negrete,
however, Stevens was not actively engaged in the pursuit of a suspect
or in an investigation. Stevens contended that her accident was
compensable because she was subject to being called to duty twenty-four
hours a day. In addition, she argued that department regulations
required that while she was within city limits, she must take appropriate action to preserve the peace, prevent crime, and enforce the laws.
Stevens's supervisor, a precinct captain, testified that the department's
policy meant that even an off-duty officer, in or out of uniform, was
expected to respond if asked for assistance by a citizen or otherwise
called to duty. Stevens and another witness testified to at least one
other occasion when Stevens participated in an arrest while off duty,
such as when a department store security guard asked her to be involved
in an arrest while she was shopping.'
Following the pattern set out in Negrete and Barge, the court held that
"[tihe fact that [Stevens] was in her personal vehicle instead of a patrol
unit when the collision at issue occurred did not render the 'continuous
employment' rule inapplicable.""' Thus, the rule now seems clear that
even if an off-duty officer is in a personal vehicle, not engaged in any
active police work, and merely at a time and place where he might be
called to duty, any injury sustained may well be compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act. The broad rulings in Negrete and Stevens
have implications for firemen, emergency medical technicians, and other
safety and law enforcement personnel who are subject to call for work
even while off duty.
VIII.

JURISDICTION AND COVERAGE

The State Board of Workers' Compensation is not a court but an
administrative body with only those powers and duties granted by the
legislature.'43
As such, the board has no jurisdiction to declare the

139. 259 Ga. App. at 892-93, 578 S.E.2d at 579.
140. 261 Ga. App. at 694, 583 S.E.2d at 553.
141. Id. at 694-96, 583 S.E.2d at 554-55.
142. Id. at 698, 583 S.E.2d at 556.
143. Natl Biscuit Co. v. Martin, 225 Ga. 198, 167 S.E.2d 140 (1969).
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rights of the parties in the same manner as a superior court.'4
Instead, the board's powers are limited to those granted under the
Workers' Compensation Act, and the purpose of the Act is to provide a
complete and exclusive system for the resolution of 1disputes
between
45
employers and employees who are subject to the Act.
The court of appeals revisited the board's subject matter jurisdiction
in Gulf States Underwriters, Inc. v. Bennett. ~ Northwest Georgia
Personal Care Home purchased an "Employers Blanket Accident Group
Policy" 4 ' through A. B. Thomas, an insurance agent, which was issued
by American Pioneer Life Insurance Company and administered by Gulf
States Underwriters of Louisiana. The policy expressly provided that it
was not a workers' compensation policy, although it shared many of the
characteristics of one. The owner of Northwest Georgia Personal Care
Home, however, was led to believe that it was a viable substitute.
Jimmy Bennett experienced an injury arising out of, and in the course
of, his employment with Northwest Georgia Personal Care Home.
Because he was dissatisfied with the amount of benefits he was receiving
through the employer's blanket accident group policy, he requested a
hearing before the State Board of Workers' Compensation. The claim
was filed against not only Northwest Georgia Personal Care Home, but
also against Gulf States Underwriters of Louisiana and A. B. Thomas,
the insurance agent. The ALJ held both Gulf States and Thomas liable
for payment of income benefits, medical expenses, and assessed attorney
fees, finding that the employer's blanket accident group policy was a
substitute system of insurance in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 34-914.1"8 This finding was affirmed by the appellate division
of the State
1 49
Board of Workers' Compensation and the superior court.
The court of appeals reversed the decisions of the lower courts and
held that the board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a
claim against the insurance agent. 5 ° The court explained that the
only basis for the claim would be fraud, and there was no statutory
authority permitting the State Board of Workers' Compensation to
adjudicate a fraud claim to assess damages against an insurance agent
who was neither an employer nor an insurer.'
Furthermore, the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 123 Ga. App. 469, 181 S.E.2d 530 (1971).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
260 Ga. App. 699, 580 S.E.2d 550 (2003).
Id. at 699, 580 S.E.2d at 551.
Id. at 699-700, 580 S.E.2d at 551; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-14 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
260 Ga. App. at 700-01, 580 S.E.2d at 552.
Id. at 702, 580 S.E.2d at 553.
Id.; see Cline v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 137 Ga. App. 76, 223 S.E.2d 14 (1975).
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court of appeals rejected the employee's argument that the insurance
agent was liable under O.C.G.A. section 33-23-41,152 "which imposes
personal liability on an insurance agent in limited circumstances."' 53
The court noted that this code section is not within the parameters of
the Workers' Compensation Act."M Furthermore, even if the agent had
some liability under that provision of the Georgia Insurance Code, it
would not follow that the State Board of Compensation would be the
proper forum to adjudicate the issue.1"
As for the claim against Gulf States, the court noted that the issue
was a bit more complex.' 56 Gulf States argued that the State Board
had no jurisdiction over a servicing agent administering a non-workers'
compensation policy, and in this instance, the policy at issue expressly
provided that it was not a workers' compensation policy.'57 However,
the court noted that the Workers' Compensation Act encompasses "'every
policy insuring the payment of compensation provided for in this article
' 158
or insuring against liability for payment of such compensation.
While the policy at issue here expressly provided that it was not a
workers' compensation policy, it nonetheless provided some coverage for
the employer for benefits it was obligated to pay to injured workers in
accordance with the Workers' Compensation Act.5 9 Therefore, the
court ruled that the State Board had subject matter jurisdiction to
address the scope of the policy. 60
However, the court of appeals disagreed with the board's conclusion
that the insurance policy constituted a substitute workers' compensation
policy under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-14.161 The basis for the court of
appeals decision was that the policy unequivocally provided that it was
not a workers' compensation policy, and it provided substantially less
coverage than the Workers' Compensation Act required.'62 One of the
fundamental requirements to qualify as a substitute system of workers'
compensation is that the policy provide benefits at least equal to those
required by the Workers' Compensation Act.'63 Consequently, the

152. O.C.G.A. § 33-23-41 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
153. 260 Ga. App. at 702, 580 S.E.2d at 553.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-125 (1998)).
159. Id. at 703, 580 S.E.2d at 553.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 704, 580 S.E.2d at 554-55; O.C.G.A. § 39-4-14 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
162. 260 Ga. App. at 704, 580 S.E.2d at 554-55.
163. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-14 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
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court of appeals held that the board had erred in concluding that the
blanket accident group policy was a substitute system of workers'
compensation coverage."
IX.

PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY

Two recent decisions further defined the prerequisites for obtaining
permanent partial disability benefits, 165 particularly what is necessary
to show that the injury is "permanent." The Georgia Supreme Court
ruled in City of Poulan v. Hodge, 66 that "the absence of the MMI
[maximum medical improvement] was not a 'legal condition precedent'
but only an evidentiary factor the ALJ was entitled to consider in
determining whether Hodge carried his burden of proving the existence
of an injury [that was permanent]." 67 The court concluded that the
lower courts misapplied the case of MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid Transit
Authority v. Ledbetter,16 1 which held that permanent partial disability
benefits were not due to an employee absent evidence that the injury
was indeed permanent and not temporary. 169 Whereas the court of
appeals held that a finding of permanency could not be made without
finding that the employee reached maximum medical improvement, the
supreme court held that the so-called MMI determination was merely a
factor for the judge to consider in determining permanency and not a
legal prerequisite. 7 0
Only a few months later, the court of appeals applied the supreme
court's holding in Hodge to Printpack, Inc. v. Crocker. 7' The employer/insurer in Crocker argued that the employee, whose index finger and
part of his thumb were amputated in a compensable injury, was required
to show that he had reached maximum medical improvement before
172
payment of permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits was due.
The court of appeals rejected this assertion, holding that the employer/insurer
did not need to know what Crocker's ultimate disability rating was
going to be once Crocker reached MMI, in order to begin payment of

164. 260 Ga. App. at 704, 580 S.E.2d at 555.
165. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
166. 275 Ga. 483, 569 S.E.2d 499 (2002).
167. Id. at 485-86, 569 S.E.2d at 502.
168. 184 Ga. App. 518, 361 S.E.2d 878 (1987).
169. 275 Ga. at 484, 569 S.E.2d at 500; see also State v. Birditt, 181 Ga. App. 356, 352
S.E.2d 203 (1986).
170. 275 Ga. at 485-86, 569 S.E.2d at 501.
171. 260 Ga. App. 67, 579 S.E.2d 225 (2003).
172. Id. at 69, 579 S.E.2d at 227.
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PPD benefits to Crocker. Printpack only needed to know that Crocker's
finger and part of his thumb were amputated, and that he thus was
entitled to PPD benefits once his [temporary total disability ("TTD")]
benefits terminated ....
In addition, the court held that even though Crocker might later
establish that he had permanent injury beyond loss of his fingers,
Printpack was not relieved from its obligation of commencing PPD
benefits based upon the amputations, as specified in O.C.G.A. section 349-263(c). 174
The court specifically stated, "if a claimant suffers a
compensable injury by loss of a body part scheduled in [O.C.G.A. section]
34-9-263(c) through amputation, the claimant need not demonstrate that
he has reached MMI before becoming entitled to PPD benefits." 7 5
X.

POSITIONAL RISK DOCTRINE

Perhaps one of the most controversial workers' compensation decisions
issued by the court of appeals during this survey period is Johnson v.
Publix Supermarkets.76 The court went to great lengths to compare
the separate doctrines of an "idiopathic injury" 177 and "positional
risk,"'78 and may have caused more, rather than less, confusion as to
how these separate doctrines will apply in future cases.
In Johnson the employee fractured her leg during the course of her
employment for Publix Supermarkets when she fell while hurrying down
a store aisle. When Johnson fell, the store was to close in thirty minutes
and Johnson, a cashier, picked up some personal items and left her
register, with the permission of her supervisor.7 9
Johnson was
"walking quickly and looking ahead for items left on the floor, as all
Publix employees were encouraged to do, when she fell and broke her
leg."8 ° Both the ALJ and the appellate division of the State Board of
Workers' Compensation concluded that Johnson's injuries were
compensable.'

173. Id. at 71-72, 579 S.E.2d at 229.
174. Id. at 70, 579 S.E.2d at 228; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263(c) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
175. 260 Ga. App. at 70, 579 S.E.2d at 228.
176. 256 Ga. App. 540, 568 S.E.2d 827 (2002).
177. Id. at 541-42, 568 S.E.2d at 828-29; see Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App.
838, 146 S.E.2d 532 (1965).
178. 256 Ga. App. at 541-42, 568 S.E.2d at 828-29; see Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards,
152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979).
179. 256 Ga. App. at 540, 568 S.E.2d at 828.
180. Id. at 540-41, 568 S.E.2d at 828.
181. Id. at 540, 568 S.E.2d at 828.
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The court of appeals agreed,' 82 and took the opportunity to compare
the cases of Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey,'8 ' and National Fire Insurance Co. v. Edwards,'84 the seminal cases for the "idiopathic injury"
and "positional risk" doctrines.' 8' The term "idiopathic" refers to a
condition which is purely personal, limited to the individual, and without
any origin in external factors. 88 In Dorsey the employee was injured
while merely walking along an aisle in her employer's plant. There was
no apparent cause related to her employment.' 87 The court held she
had an idiopathic injury, which is not compensable under the Act.'
The "positional risk" doctrine developed in Edwards provides that
"'[w]here the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and
a time), the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred
because it results from a risk common to all others.'"' 89 The employee
in Edwards was injured when a wind storm or tornado struck a building
in which he was working. 190 He was at a place and time required by
his employment, and although the risk to him was the same as it was
to other non-employees, his injury was compensable.' 9 '
Comparing the two theories, the court in Johnson held that "[ulnder
the 'positional risk doctrine,' Johnson's claim is compensable. If she had
not been working, she would not have been hurrying through the aisles
so she could be available to check out more customers if needed."'92
From the facts of the case, Johnson's injury would not appear to
constitute an "idiopathic" injury, as it appears that she fell specifically
because she was hurrying to do her job.' 9 ' The fact that she was
hurrying because of her job seems to constitute a causal connection to
her employment, but it also seems that the "positional risk" doctrine
would not apply either because Johnson's injuries were not the result of
any external factor to which the general public was exposed.'9 4

182. Id. at 543, 568 S.E.2d at 830.
183. 112 Ga. App. 838, 146 S.E.2d 532 (1965).
184. 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979).
185. Johnson, 256 Ga. App. at 541-42, 568 S.E.2d at 828-29.
186. Id. at 541, 568 S.E.2d at 828.
187. 112 Ga. App. at 839-40, 146 S.E.2d at 534.
188. Id. at 840, 146 S.E.2d at 534.
189. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. at 567, 263 S.E.2d at 456 (quoting McKiney v. Reynolds
& Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1949)).
190. Id. at 566, 263 S.E.2d at 455.
191. Id. at 568, 263 S.E.2d at 456.
192. 256 Ga. App. at 542, 568 S.E.2d at 829.
193. Id. at 543, 568 S.E.2d at 830.
194. Id. at 542, 568 S.E.2d at 829.
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An interesting dissent filed by Judge Pope took issue with the lower
court's conclusions regarding the condition of the floor on which Johnson
slipped and noted that there was no evidence in the record, other than
Johnson's manager's statement that Johnson said she tripped over her
own feet, to show what caused Johnson to fall.'9 5 In Judge Pope's
opinion, there was no evidence "that the fall resulted from any cause
that could not have happened anywhere, under any conditions, at any
time...,
and therefore, no causal connection existed to the employee's employment.19 7 The majority also, in part, based its decision on
the long-standing doctrine that "[a] liberal construction must be given
to effectuate the humane purposes for which the Workers' Compensation
Act was enacted,"' 9 even though a 1992 amendment to the Georgia
Workers' Compensation Act specifically provides that "[t]his chapter
shall be liberally construed only for the purpose of bringing employers
and employees within the provisions of this chapter ... [and] [t]he
provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied impartially to
both employers and employees."'9 9 In the final analysis, therefore, the
decision in Johnson may ultimately be only narrowly applied to the
unusual circumstances of its facts, rather than dramatically applied to
reshape the law.
XI.

SETTLEMENT

Willis v. McClain Industries, Inc., ° ° provides the first clear authority that payment of a valid child support lien is sufficient to relieve an
employer/insurer's obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits.20'
In Willis the employer/insurer paid $6246 in income benefits, pursuant
to an ALJ award, directly to the Child Support Enforcement Unit, which
had a valid lien on Willis's workers' compensation benefits. The
employee then filed suit in superior court to enforce the AIU award and
to seek direct payment to him.2 °2 Both the superior court and the
court of appeals rejected the employee's arguments, and specifically held

195. Id. at 545, 568 S.E.2d at 831 (Pope, P.J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 545-46, 568 S.E.2d at 831 (Pope, P.J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 546, 568 S.E.2d at 831 (Pope, P.J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 543, 568 S.E.2d at 830 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. S. Elec., Inc., 209 Ga.
App. 718, 434 S.E.2d 507 (1993)).
199. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
200. 260 Ga. App. 195, 581 S.E.2d 293 (2003).
201. Id. at 196, 581 S.E.2d at 294.
202. Id. at 195, _581 S.E.2d at 294.
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that "an employer or insurer may satisfy their obligation to pay an
award through satisfying a valid child support obligation."" 3
Northeast Georgia Health System, Inc. v. Danner2" dealt with
substantial compliance with the Workers' Compensation Act's rules
regarding the prompt payment of settlements. After settling her
workers' compensation case, Danner's employer inadvertently mailed the
settlement check to Danner's former address. The postal service
readdressed the check to Danner's new address, but Danner alleged that
she received the check on the twenty-first day after the board approved
the settlement agreement. Danner argued that because she received the
settlement check more than twenty days after the award approving the
settlement, the employer was liable to her20 5for a twenty percent late
penalty under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(f).
However, the court of appeals rejected this argument holding that the
postal service corrected the employer's mistake and re-sent the
settlement check to Danner's proper address before the twenty-day time
limit expired.20 6 Interpreting the applicable code section, the court
stated that
tilt is clear that the legislature was primarily concerned with ensuring
that the employee received full and timely payment of settlement
amounts .... Thus, due to the diligence of the postal service, full
payment was made in the time and manner required, and we fail to see
how Danner was harmed by the fact that the payment was properly
mailed by the postal service and not the servicing agent. 0 7

XII.

REDUCTION OF BENEFITS UNDER

O.C.G.A. SECTION 34-9-104208

The court of appeals has strictly interpreted all notice requirements
in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2) 9 to prevent an employer and
insurer from reducing an employee's benefits when those notice
provisions are not met.210 In City of Atlanta v. Sumlin,2 1' the employee was injured in 1997 and began receiving temporary total
disability ("TTD") benefits. On October 29, 1998, the authorized treating
physician released the employee to perform his duties with limitations,

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 196, 581 S.E.2d at 294.
260 Ga. App. 504, 580 S.E.2d 293 (2003).
Id. at 504-05, 580 S.E.2d at 294; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(f) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
260 Ga. App. at 506, 580 S.E.2d at 295.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
Id. § 34-9-104(a)(2).
See City of Atlanta v. Sumlin, 258 Ga. App. 643, 574 S.E.2d 827 (2002).
258 Ga. App. 643, 574 S.E.2d 827 (2002).
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but the employee never actually returned to work. On July 27, 2000, the
authorized treating physician confirmed that the employee had been able
to work with limitations since 1998. On August 14, 2000, the employer
filed Board Form WC-104, attaching the physician's note stating that he
had been able to work at limited duty since 1998, and served those
documents on the employee. On September 5, 2000, the employer filed
Board Form WC-2, reducing the employee's benefits to temporary partial
disability ("TPD") benefits. 12
The employee objected to the reduction of his benefits and filed for a
hearing. 213 At issue was the language of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104
(a)(2),214 which provides in part that:
"When an injury is not catastrophic ... and the employee is not
working, the board shall determine that a change in condition for the
better has occurred and the employee shall be entitled to the payment
of benefits for partial disability in accordance with Code Section 34-9262 if it is determined that the employee has been capable of performing work with limitations or restrictions for 52 consecutive weeks.
Within 60 days of the employee's release to return to work with
restrictions or limitations, the employee shall receive notice from the
employer on a form provided by the board that will inform the
employee that he or she has been released to work with limitations or
restrictions, will include an explanation of the limitations or restrictions, and will inform the employee of the general terms of this Code
section. In no event shall an employee be eligible for more than 78
aggregate weeks of benefits for total disability while such employee is
capable of performing work with limitations or restrictions .... ,"
The corresponding Board Rule requires that Board Form WC- 104 must
have been sent, with the appropriate medical report, to the employee
"'no later than 60 days after the date that the employee was determined
2 16
able to return to work with restrictions or limitations.'
Pending the hearing, the ALJ required the employer to maintain the
benefits at the full TTD rate. The main issue was whether the seventyeight week limit on TTD benefits was conditioned on compliance with
the provisions for notice to the employee. At the hearing, the claims
adjuster presented uncontradicted testimony that more than seventyeight aggregate weeks had passed since the employee was released by

212. Id. at 643-44, 574 S.E.2d at 827-28.
213. Id. at 644, 574 S.E.2d at 828.
214. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1021(a)(2) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
215. 258 Ga. App. at 644-45, 574 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2)).
216. Id. at 645, 574 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting Rules and Regulations of the State Board
of Workers' Compensation (2002)).
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the authorized treating physician to work with restrictions, and that the
employer continued to pay full TTD benefits for four weeks beyond those
seventy-eight weeks.217
Following the hearing, the ALJ found that the doctor's release on July
27, 2000, confirming the earlier release with restrictions, was not
sufficient to meet the requirement imposed by Board Rule 104 for giving
the employee notice within sixty days of the release because the original
release had actually been issued for the first time on October 29,
1998.218 The AU determined that the employer did not comply with
section 34-9-104 or Rule 104 and refused to allow the reduction of
benefits. The appellate division affirmed the AL's ruling.2 19
The court of appeals accepted the case and affirmed the appellate
division, holding that the interpretation of a statute by the agency
charged with enforcing or administering its provisions was to be given
great weight and deference, unless contrary to law. 220 Despite the
employer's argument that the "in no event" language meant that the
legislature intended the requirement that TTD benefits would be limited
to seventy-eight weeks, the court also noted that the word "shall"
(describing the notice that must be sent to the employee) was similarly
compelling. 221 The court determined that its "duty [was] to find
meaning in all portions of the statutory provision in a manner which
avoids, if practical, any conclusion that the provisions [were] inconsistent
or contradictory."222 The only way to do this was to find that the
provision limiting benefits was contingent on an employer's compliance
with the notice provision.223
XIII.

STATUTE OF LIMiTATIONS

This past year brought three statute of limitations cases to the
appellate courts. The first case was D. W. Adcock, M.D., PC. v.
Adcock, 224 in which a doctor sued his insurer for an on-the-job injury.
Dr. Adcock had been an orthopaedic surgeon for twenty-five years, over
which time he gradually developed severe eczema that ultimately forced
him to stop working in his profession. The medical evidence showed,
and the ALJ found, that the eczema was both caused and aggravated by

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

258 Ga. App. at 643-44, 574 S.E.2d at 828.
Id. at 644, 574 S.E.2d at 828.
Id.
Id. at 645, 574 S.E.2d at 829.
Id. at 646, 574 S.E.2d at 829.
Id.
Id.
257 Ga. App. 700, 572 S.E.2d 45 (2002).
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Dr. Adcock's frequent hand washing between patients, as well as the
intense scrubbing he was required to undertake in preparation for
surgery.225 However, this finding of compensability is not what makes
Adcock an important case. Instead, this case is noteworthy because of
the AU's finding that the employer and insurer were estopped from
asserting their statute of limitations defense against the doctor.226
Dr. Adcock stopped working on May 31, 1998, and initially filed his
claim with the insurer, MAG Mutual, on July 14, 1998. MAG Mutual
denied the claim four months later, telling him-falsely-that it did not
provide coverage for the date of the accident claimed. MAG Mutual
referred Dr. Adcock to his employer's subsequent insurer, who investigated and concluded that it would not accept the claim. The doctor
reinstated his original claim against MAG Mutual, but MAG Mutual
denied it on the ground that he had not filed a claim with the board
within one year of the date of accident, May 31, 1998, as required by
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82(a). 227 Dr. Adcock then filed a request for a
hearing with the board on January 26, 2000. Again, the insurer argued
that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.22
In upholding the board's determination that the employer and insurer
were estopped from asserting a statute of limitations
defense, the court
229
of appeals quoted Brown Transport Corp. v. James:
"The conduct of defendant and its insurance carrier may be such as to
estop them from presenting the statutory limitation as a defense in bar
of the claim for compensation, if the effect of such conduct was to
mislead or deceive claimant, whether intentional or not, and induce
him to withhold or postpone filing his claim petition until
more than
2 °
a year had elapsed from the occurrence of the accident."
Thus, under the court of appeals decision in Adcock, it is irrelevant
whether the insurer intentionally misleads the employee; even an
unintentionally false statement that induces an employee to postpone
the filing of a worker's compensation claim may result in estoppel
against the employer and insurer.23 1

225.

Id. at 700-01, 572 S.E.2d at 46-47.

226. Id. at 701, 572 S.E.2d at 47.
227. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 46-47; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1998 & Supp. 2003). Section 34-982(a) states, in pertinent part, "The right to compensation shall be barred unless a claim
therefor is filed within one year after injury.. .. " Id.
228. 257 Ga. App. at 701, 572 S.E.2d at 47.
229. 243 Ga. 701, 257 S.E.2d 242 (1979).
230. 257 Ga. App. at 703, 572 S.E.2d at 47 (quoting Brown Transp. Corp., 243 Ga. at
701-02, 257 S.E.2d at 242).
231. Id. at 703-04, 572 S.E.2d at 48.
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In AT&T v. Barnes,232 a change in condition case, the employer and
insurer also lost their statute of limitations defense, but for reasons
different from those in Adcock.2 33 In Barnes the employee was injured
on February 1, 1993, and returned to work for a short time thereafter.
She eventually ceased working as a result of her injury and was paid
TTD benefits until November 10, 1994. The employer then began paying
Barnes short term disability ("STD") benefits in an amount that was less
than the TTD rate. In 1996 Barnes retired and began to collect her
pension. More than two years after her retirement, she requested a
hearing seeking reinstatement of TTD benefits. Barnes argued that the
employer/insurer had improperly suspended her TTD benefits in 1994
and had paid her too little in STD and retirement benefits, as compared
to what workers' compensation would have paid her. Benefits were
awarded to the employee. 2 4
The issue on appeal was whether the employer and insurer had timely
raised their statute of limitations defense. 23" The employer/insurer
had a clear statute of limitations defense to Barnes's change in condition
claim because she filed it more than two years after her TTD benefits
were suspended. 3 6 However, the court stated that "'[tlhe bar of the
statute of limitation is a privilege to the defendant, the benefit of which
it may elect to take advantage of or to waive as it pleases.'" 23' The
court further cited the long-standing rule that "a defense must be raised
not later than the first hearing," or else it is waived. 23' Because the
record contained no evidence that the employer and insurer raised the
statute of limitations defense at or prior to the hearing before the ALJ,
they were deemed to have waived that defense.239
Before the ink on Barnes was even dry, the court of appeals was citing
to it in a case that addressed yet another twist on the statute of
limitations issue.240 In Stephenson v. Roper Pump Co.,241 the em-

232. 260 Ga. App. 209, 581 S.E.2d 260 (2003).
233. Id. at 211, 581 S.E.2d at 262.
234. Id. at 209-10, 581 S.E.2d at 261.
235. Id. at 210, 581 S.E.2d at 261. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (1998 & Supp. 2000) states
that a party can apply for reinstatement of income benefits "provided... that at the time
of application not more than two years have elapsed since the date the last payment of
income benefits pursuant to Code Section 34-9-261 or 34-9-262 was actually made .... "
236. Id.
237. Id. (quoting Baugh-Carroll v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph County, 248 Ga. App. 591,
593, 545 S.E.2d 690, 693 (2001)).
238. Id. (citing Thigpen v. Hall, 46 Ga. App. 356, 167 S.E.2d 728 (1933)).
239. Id. at 211, 581 S.E.2d at 262.
240. Stephenson v. Roper Pump Co., 261 Ga. App. 131, 581 S.E.2d 741 (2003).
241. Id.
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ployee injured his back on June 19, 1992, and was paid benefits by
Roper, without an award, until July 10, 1995. The employee eventually
went to work for another company, Saul's Machines, and aggravated his
back injury on September 11, 2000. Stephenson filed a claim for
reinstatement of income benefits against his original employer, Roper,
which controverted the claim based upon both the two-year statute of
limitations for a change in condition and a new injury. Roper then filed
a motion for summary judgment with the board, based upon the twoof limitations defense, and this motion was granted by the
year statute
2
24

AUj.

Stephenson made a rather novel argument on appeal to circumvent
the obvious change in condition statute of limitations problems he faced:

He argued that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h) 24--and not section 34-9-

104-was the applicable statute, and that the employer and insurer were
therefore precluded from asserting a defense to the claim because their
controvert was filed more than eighty-one days after he requested a
hearing, and they failed to pay him income benefits before controverting. 2 " The court of appeals disagreed. 245 First, citing Barnes, the
court reiterated that a statute of limitations defense must be raised at
or prior to the first hearing to be preserved.2 46 Moreover, the court
noted, "[w]aiver does not occur until discovery of the defense and
247
opportunity to raise this defense at or prior to the first hearing."
Roper timely raised the statute of limitations defense because it did so
as soon as it became clear that the claim for benefits was barred, and
prior to any hearing in the case. 24
As for whether section 34-9-221(h) barred the employer/insurer from
controverting Stephenson's claim, the court pointed out that the
applicable subsection of section 34-9-221 was actually subsection (d), not
(h): "In this case, benefits were not being paid on the TTD, although

242. Id. at 131-32, 581 S.E.2d at 742.
243. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h) (1998 & Supp. 2003) (stating, "Where compensation is being
paid without an award, the right to compensation shall not be controverted except upon
the grounds of change in condition or newly discovered evidence unless notice to controvert
is filed with the board within 60 days of the due date of first payment of compensation.").
244. 261 Ga. App. at 133-34, 581 S.E.2d at 743. See Cartersville Ready Mix Co. v.
Hamby, 224 Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996) (holding that an employer/insurer who
is voluntarily paying benefits, but fails to pay all benefits and penalties due prior to filing
a controvert, is barred from controverting the claim under the terms of O.C.G.A. section
34-9-221(h)).
245. 261 Ga. App. at 133, 581 S.E.2d at 743.
246. Id. at 133, 581 S.E.2d at 743.
247. Id., 581 S.E.2d at 742.
248. Id. at 135, 581 S.E.2d at 743-44.

510

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

benefits had once been paid prior to 1995 for TTD .... The General
Assembly used the language 'where compensation is being paid without
an award' in subsection (h) to apply only where such payment is
ongoing."2 49 Referring to Meredith v. Atlanta Intermodal Rail Services25 ° for the proposition that section 34-9-221(d) does not preclude
the employer/insurer from defending a claim when the controvert is filed
late, the court affirmed the ALffs dismissal of Stephenson's claim based
on the change in condition statute of limitations.2
XIV.

STROKE

In 1996 the Act was amended to provide that heart disease, heart
attack, or stroke is compensable if "it is shown by a preponderance of
competent and credible evidence, which shall include medical evidence,
that any of such conditions were attributable to the performance of the
usual work of employment."2 2 The 1996 amendment containing the
phrase "shall include medical evidence "2 11 was added largely in
response to a stroke case which allowed an employee to recover despite
uncontradicted medical testimony that his stroke was not workrelated.M
In

25
2001 the court of appeals decided AFLAC, Inc. v. Hardy, 5

holding that an employee did not meet her burden of proof when she
presented medical evidence showing virtually no causal connection
between her alleged job stress and her heart attack. 2 " The court
noted that the burden of proof could not be met when the employee's
medical evidence showed only that a stressful job "can play a role in
exacerbating symptoms." 2 7 The court specifically determined that an
employee must present more than mere speculation regarding the causal
relationship between the job and her cardiovascular disorder.258
In a 2002 case involving a stroke, the court was provided another
opportunity to review a case under the language of O.C.G.A. section 34-

249. Id. at 134, 581 S.E.2d at 743.
250. 274 Ga. 809, 561 S.E.2d 67 (2002).

See H. Michael Bagley et aL., Workers'

Compensation, 54 MERCER L. REV. 617, 627 (2002).

251. 261 Ga. App. at 133, 581 S.E.2d at 743.
252. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
253.

Id.

254. See Reynolds Constr. Co. v. Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. 23, 459 S.E.2d 612 (1995); see
also H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 48 MERCER L. REV. 583, 588 (1996).

255. 250 Ga. App. 570, 552 S.E.2d 505 (2001).
256. Id. at 572, 552 S.E.2d at 508.
257.
258.

Id., 552 S.E.2d at 507.
Id.
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9-1(4).259 Although the medical evidence presented on behalf of the
employee in Pitts v. City of Rome 260 appears to have been stronger
than that presented by the employee in last year's heart attack case, the
that the employee did not meet the requisite
court again determined
2 61
burden of proof.
Oscar Pitts was a major with the City of Rome Police Department. He
worked for the department almost thirty-one years, and held various
responsibilities, including overseeing the training center, coordinating
the department's fleet vehicles, issuing uniforms, and taking care of
technical services. In the six or seven months before his stroke, he
primarily focused on overseeing construction of a new firing range and
a new public safety building. Pitts suffered a stroke on October 16,
1997, from a cardiac embolism, a blood clot from his heart which
traveled to his brain. He filed a workers' compensation claim against
the city, asserting that work-related stress contributed to his stroke. He
died on February 12, 1999, from complications related to the stroke. His
widow pursued the claim.262
At the hearing, several witnesses testified that Major Pitts enjoyed
supervising the construction projects, although he experienced frustration due to some problems with the projects. However, the primary
stressor in Major Pitts's life during the months preceding the stroke
involved his son's conviction for drug trafficking. Pitts believed that the
arresting officers had tampered with the evidence, and that the sentence
his son received was too harsh. Pitts blamed the arrest and the sentence
on his position with the Rome Police Department.2 6
The employee's wife testified that her husband had not felt well in the
months before his stroke. He was often tired, and he had increased his
smoking habit. He had a history of medical problems, including two
heart attacks, heart bypass surgery, congestive heart failure, a
ventricular aneurysm, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and high
triglycerides. Dr. Joseph Biusco, who was the employee's internist for
the ten years before his stroke, prescribed numerous medications,
including Coumadin, a blood thinner. The evidence showed that in the
two weeks before his stroke, Pitts failed to take his Coumadin for a oneweek period. 2"

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
256 Ga. App. 278, 568 S.E.2d 167 (2002).
Id. at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 168-69.
Id. at 278-79, 568 S.E.2d at 167-68.
Id. at 279, 568 S.E.2d at 168.
Id.
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The widow also presented evidence from Dr. Raymond Capps, a
neurologist who treated Major Pitts following the stroke. He testified
that Pitts had several risk factors for a stroke, such as advancing age,
high blood pressure, heart disease, smoking, genetic history, and a
previous history of vascular disease.2 65 However, Dr. Capps also
testified that the stroke "was exaggerated by his job as a police captain
[sic] with extreme stress and fatigue from this position. His blood
pressure and heart condition were also worsened by these work-related
factors. In all, Mr. Pitts was at risk for major cardiovascular events
given his high stress occupation."266
The city presented medical evidence refusing Dr. Capps's conclusions. 2 " Dr. Michael Ware testified that it was impossible to state
that job stress contributed to the stroke, and that even assuming that
Pitts suffered from work-related stress, such stress could not be tied to
his stroke, especially given that Mr. Pitts "had missed about a week or
so of his blood thinner."21 In Dr. Ware's view, any conclusion that job
stress, or any sort of stress, contributed to the stroke would be speculative. Dr. Biusco, the internist, also testified that he could not say
whether stress had anything to do with Mr. Pitts's stroke.26 9
The ALJ found that Pitts was under stress at the time of his stroke,
but that a review of the evidence, including the testimony of the three
doctors, showed that there was "only a possibility that this stress
contributed to the onset of the stroke and, thus, to the eventual
death."2 7' Despite the evidence presented by Dr. Capps, the ALJ
seemed to find that the evidence was little better than that presented in
Hardy, finding that "any effort to tie [the] stroke to stress fell within the
realm of possibilities and speculation."2 71 The AUJ went on to make
an alternative ruling that if the employee was under stress that
contributed to the stroke, the primary stress Major Pitts experienced
involved his son and not his job. The ALJ denied the claim, and the
appellate division adopted the AJ's findings.272
The court of appeals noted that it was required to construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the
board.2 71 In affirming the appellate division, the court pointed out

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 279-80, 568 S.E.2d at 168.
at 280, 568 S.E.2d at 168.
at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 169.
at 278, 568 S.E.2d at 168.
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that the evidence linking stress to Major Pitts's stroke was conflicting. 274 Two doctors refused to draw a causal connection between the
stroke and the alleged work-related stress. 75 The court noted that
although Mrs. Pitts did present competing medical testimony, the fact
finder resolved the evidentiary conflict against her, as it was entitled to
do, and thus the 2court
would not disturb that finding under the any
76
evidence standard.
Judge Barnes dissented, advocating a more liberal interpretation of
section 34-9-1(4) and stating that the ALJ applied an incorrect standard
of law when finding that work duties had to be a primary, rather than
a secondary, contributing cause of the stress leading to the stroke. 7
Judge Barnes quoted Phillips CorrectionalInstitute v. Yarbrough271 for
this proposition: "'work need be only a contributing factor to a heart
279
injury [or stroke] in order for that injury to be compensable.'"
However, if work duties need only be a contributing factor to the stroke,
then it would seem that the employee would never have to meet the
requirement of proving the causal connection by "a preponderance of
competent and credible evidence."28 °
XV. SUBROGATION

The court of appeals addressed three subrogation cases this year,
continuing the trend toward rulings -favorable to employee/plaintiffs and
generally unfavorable to employers and insurers. The first is International Maintenance Corp. v. Inland Paper Board & Packaging, Inc.2"'
The case is procedurally complicated but essentially concerns what
grounds, if any, allow the trial court to dismiss an employer and insurer
who have properly intervened in the plaintiff/employee's personal injury
action, and if an employer/insurer's trial tactics can be so egregious as
to cause it to forfeit its lien.28 2
The plaintiff/employee was Jonathan Massey ("Massey"), who was
working for International Maintenance Corporation ("IMC"), when he
was injured on January 24, 1996. Massey was on the premises of a

274. Id. at 280-81, 568 S.E.2d at 169.
275. Id. at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 169.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 281-82, 568 S.E.2d at 170 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
278. 248 Ga. App. 693, 548 S.E.2d 424 (2001).
279. 256 Ga. App. at 282, 568 S.E.2d at 170 (Barnes, J., dissenting) (quoting
Yarbrough, 248 Ga. App. at 695, 548 S.E.2d at 426).
280. O.C.G.A § 34-9-1(4) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
281. 256 Ga. App. 752, 569 S.E.2d 865 (2002).
282. Id. at 753, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
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sawmill owned by Inland Paper Board & Packaging, Inc. ("Inland") when
a removable steel staircase and platform owned and maintained by
Inland, designed by Mid-South Engineering Company ("Mid-South"), and
constructed by Reynolds Industrial Contractors ("Reynolds"), fell on him,
severing his spinal cord and rendering him paralyzed. Massey was paid
workers' compensation benefits by his employer, IMC, and its insurer,
National Union Fire Insurance Company ("National Union"). 8
Massey and his wife filed a personal injury action against Inland, MidSouth, and Reynolds. IMC and National Union intervened in the suit
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1,284 seeking to assert a subrogation lien to recover medical and disability benefits paid to Massey.
Massey then settled with Mid-South and Reynolds, and dismissed his
claims against those defendants. The trial court allowed the dismissal
over the objections of IMC and National Union. 8 5
Next, Inland moved for summary judgment. IMC and National Union
filed a brief in agreement. Because IMC was contractually obligated to
indemnify Inland for liability for maintenance work performed at
Inland's facility, IMC did not want the Masseys to recover damages from
Inland. Also, National Union had a conflict of interest in that it
provided both workers' compensation and liability coverage for Massey's
employer, IMC, thus making it the liability carrier for Inland by virtue
of the indemnity contract between IMC and Inland.288
The Masseys then filed a motion to strike the intervenors' pleadings,
to dismiss the intervenors as parties to the action, and to force forfeiture
of the lien. The trial court clearly disliked the litigation tactics of
intervenors IMC and National Union. It issued an order finding that
IMC and National Union acted wrongfully in joining the effort to defeat
Massey's recovery and that IMC and National Union abused the
privileges granted by section 34-9-11.1.287 The trial court found that
the actions of the intervenors were "blatantly egregious" and "fundamentally wrong," and that the intervenors hindered the Masseys' efforts to
secure a complete and adequate recovery. 288 The trial court then
dismissed IMC and National Union as intervenors, leaving them to
prosecute a separate action if they wished to perfect and enforce their
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Id. at 752, 569 S.E.2d at 866.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (1998 & Supp. 2003).
256 Ga. App. at 752-53, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 753, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
Id.
Id. at 754, 569 S.E.2d at 867-68.

2003]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

515

subrogation lien. Thereafter, the Masseys settled with the remaining
defendant, Inland, and filed for a final dismissal with prejudice.28 9
IMC and National Union appealed, arguing that the trial court made
its first error in improperly dismissing them from the case. While the
trial court's order seemed to suggest that it dismissed IMC and National
Union from the lawsuit and forced them to forfeit their lien, the Masseys
pointed out that the trial court had not in fact issued a judgment or
order regarding the forfeiture of the lien. Thus, the appeal filed by IMC
and National Union was premature.290
Additionally, the Masseys
argued that IMC and National Union, even if dismissed, were in the
same position they would be in had they not been dismissed because
IMC and National Union would still have to show that Massey had been
"fully and completely compensated" to establish the validity of their
lien.29'
The court of appeals addressed the dismissal of IMC and National
Union from the lawsuit.292 The court sympathized with the trial
court's attempts to arrive at a reasonable remedy in light of the conflicts
of interest and litigation tactics which arose in the case. 293 However,
the court of appeals determined that the trial court's remedy of
dismissing the intervenors and allowing them to bring a separate action
was not acceptable in light of the legislature's mandate that employers
and insurers have an absolute right to intervene to enforce their
subrogation liens.294
Further, the court of appeals noted that an intervenor may file
whatever briefs, evidence, or other papers it chooses. 295 The trial court
clearly did not appreciate the tactics of IMC and National Union in
supporting Inland's motion for summary judgment, but the court of
appeals pointed out that an intervenor may file "'any pleading in the
case that original parties could have filed. ' ' 296 The court went on to
specifically note that "[an intervenor's choice of pleadings or argument
may on occasion conflict with a plaintiff's choice,"29 ' but that the trial
court must referee disagreements and conflicts on a case-by-case

289. Id. at 753, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 754, 569 S.E.2d at 868.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. (quoting Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 262, 167 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 889 (1969)).
297. Id.
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Drastic action such as dismissing the intervenors from the
case, or forcing forfeiture of the lien, is not within the trial court's
discretion.29 9
The court of appeals noted that a close reading of the trial court's
order revealed that it did not fully grant the Masseys' motion to strike
the intervenors' pleadings, dismiss them from the lawsuit, and force
them to forfeit their lien. 00 The court of appeals determined that
although the Masseys asked IMC and National Union to forfeit their
lien, the trial court did not in fact rule that the intervenors had forfeited
their lien.3 0 ' Instead, the court ruled that the intervenors
could
02
enforce "whatever lien they may have" in a separate action.
The intervenors cited as the trial court's second error the dismissal of
defendants Mid-South and Reynolds. 0 3 However, the court of appeals
quickly affirmed the trial court's discretion to allow the dismissals.3 4
While O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1 allowed IMC and National Union to
intervene and become plaintiffs, the statute did not take away the
Masseys' right to direct their lawsuit against the alleged tortfeasors.3 '
The Masseys had the absolute right to settle with one or more of the
defendants. 30 6 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by approving
the dismissals, nor by refusing to force the Masseys to place the
settlement proceeds in a constructive trust, as requested by IMC and
National Union.30 7
The court of appeals remanded the case back to the trial court.30 '
Defendants had all been dismissed with prejudice, so the trial court was
left to adjudicate the claims of the intervenors against the Masseys. The
lien attached to the recovery. On remand, the only issue would be
whether the settlements fully and completely compensated the employee. 309
Thus, although the court of appeals ruling was ostensibly
favorable to the employer and insurer by allowing them to avoid being
fully dismissed from the case, the final outcome would come down to the
"full and complete compensation" issue, which is often an extremely

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 755, 569 S.E.2d at 868.
Id., 569 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 753-54, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 754, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
Id.
Id. at 755, 569 S.E.2d at 868-69.
Id. at 755-56, 569 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1).
Id. at 755, 569 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 755-56, 569 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 757, 569 S.E.2d at 870.
Id. at 755, 569 S.E.2d at 868.
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difficult, sometimes
impossible, burden for an employer and insurer to
310
overcome.
The second subrogation case decided by the court was CanalInsurance
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.3 ' In this case, the employer and
insurer never intervened in the employee's personal injury action. But
after the employee settled with the tortfeasor, the employer and insurer
objected to the settlement, arguing essentially that the tortfeasor's
insurer failed to honor the subrogation lien by settling with the
employee.312 In this case, the court provided an extremely detailed
and comprehensive overview of many of the cases it had addressed since
the statute was implemented, 33 and for that reason, the case provides
an excellent "road map" (complete with "potholes") for practitioners
handling subrogation cases on behalf of employers and insurers.
The facts arose out of an employee's injury which occurred at Harry's
Farmers Market ("Harry's"). The employee, who worked for Thomas
Trucking Company, filed suit against Harry's. Liberty Mutual insured
Harry's, and Canal insured Thomas Trucking. The employer and Canal
did not intervene in the employee's third-party suit, although they did
put all parties on notice of their lien. Liberty Mutual settled with the
employee paying $100,000 for pain and suffering. The employee had
special damages of $133,000, claiming $40,000 of that figure as lost
wages. The settlement did not cover his lost wages and medical
expenses and thus, they remained outstanding. After settling, the
employee dismissed his suit against Harry's with prejudice. 14
Canal, the workers' compensation carrier, paid $27,186.16 in medical
expenses and $52,650 in disability benefits. Liberty took the position
that its settlement with the employee was less than full compensation
for his injuries and damages, both economic and noneconomic, based on
the evidence. Upon learning of the settlement, Canal filed suit against
Liberty Mutual, arguing that Liberty Mutual failed to honor Canal's
workers' compensation subrogation lien by settling with the employee.
Both Canal and Liberty Mutual filed motions for summary judgment.
The trial court denied Canal's motion and granted Liberty Mutual's
motion, finding that Canal's derivative claim was lost when the
employee's suit was dismissed with prejudice. The trial court determined that absent intervention in the suit, Canal could not carry its

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 755-56, 569 S.E.2d at 867.
256 GA. Anp 866, 570 .&.2d 60 (2C02).
Id. at 866-67, 570 S.E.2d at 62-63.
Id. at 867-74, 570 S.E.2d at 63-67.
Id. at 866, 570 S.E.2d at 62.
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employee had been fully compensated for his
burden of proving that31the
5
damages.
and
injuries
Canal appealed, arguing that the trial court made several errors.
Canal argued first that the trial court erred in finding that the workers'
compensation insurer must intervene in an employee's tort suit to
appeals, however,
protect and enforce its subrogation.31 6 The court 3of
17
did not agree, and affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The court of appeals pointed to the statutory language in section 34-911.1(b), which states that the employer and insurer have a right to
The right to seek
intervene to protect their subrogation rights.3 1
subrogation arises solely by operation of the statute, so the employer and
insurer must follow the statutory procedures. 9 The court noted that
a subrogation lien must be enforced against the third-party tortfeasor
either by intervention in the employee's suit, by direct suit against the
tortfeasor within the statutory terms (if the employee has not filed his
own suit), or by a claim against the recovery.32 ° The key here was that
notice alone was not sufficient to force the parties to "look out" for the
interests of the employer and workers' compensation insurance
carrier. 21 The subrogation lien is lost against the third-party if there
is no direct suit or intervention in the employee's suit, and the subrogation lien may only be asserted against the recovery in the hands of the
employee after he has been made whole.322
The court added that an employee may settle his lawsuit and release
the third-party tortfeasor prior to receiving workers' compensation
payments32 3 or after receiving payments.32 4 As for any claims of an

315. Id. at 866-67, 570 S.E.2d at 62-63.
316. Id. at 867, 570 S.E.2d at 63.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 867-68, 570 S.E.2d at 63-64.
319. Id. at 868, 570 S.E.2d at 64.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 868-69, 570 S.E.2d at 64; see Anthem Cas. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 246 Ga. App.
778, 782, 542 S.E.2d 171, 173 (2000).
323. 256 Ga. App. at 869, 579 S.E.2d at 64. "Where [an] employee settle[s] his lawsuit
and release[s] the third-party tortfeasor prior to receiving any workers' compensation
payments, ... the settlement and release extinguish[es] any and all future subrogation
rights later asserted by the employer or its insurer." Id. Notice of a pending workers'
compensation claim to the tortfeasor does not give rise to a possible future subrogation lien,
when no payments had been made at the time of settlement. Id. (citing Ga. Star Plumbing,
Inc. v. Bowen, 225 Ga. App. 379, 484 S.E.2d 26 (1997)).
324. Id. When the employee has received workers' compensation benefits but settles
his personal injury claim against a tortfeasor without filing suit, and when the tortfeasor
has no knowledge of the workers' compensation subrogation lien, the employer and insurer
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employer or insurer against settlement proceeds, "[t]he trial court and
not a jury must determine if the employee has been fully and completely
compensated by workers' compensation benefits and by a recovery from
a third-party tortfeasor."125 If the case goes to trial, a bifurcated trial
and special verdict form must be used to determine what recovery is
returned for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering,
because the subrogation cannot be satisfied out of a noneconomic
recovery.3 26 The legal duty to make the determination that the
employee has been made whole still remains with the trial court.327
Canal next argued that the trial court erred in interpreting the terms
"fully and completely compensated" in section 34-9-11.1(b).
The
court of appeals again agreed that the trial court reached the correct
decision, concluding that "'Georgia public policy strongly supports the
rule that an insurer may not obtain reimbursement unless and until its
insured has been completely compensated for his losses.'" '29 Unless a
trial court's decision on whether the employee has been fully and
completely compensated is clearly erroneous, the court of appeals will
affirm the trial court's findings. 3 °
The court noted that in this case, "Canal did not intervene or
otherwise seek to protect in court its derivative subrogation right, and
there is no evidence that [the employee's] recovery by settlement with
the tortfeasor consisted of anything other than noneconomic damages, "331 and Canal would have no rights against a recovery for noneconomic damages under section 34-9-11.1.332 The court stated that it was
Canal's own inaction that made it impossible for it to carry its burden
of proof so that the trial court could determine if the employee had been
fully and completely compensated.333
The third subrogation case, P. F Moon & Co. v. Payne,3 34 concerned
an employer and insurer's direct suit against an alleged defendant and

have no claim against the tortfeasor by way of a subrogation action, but the subrogation
lien does attach to the recovery by settlement. See Rowland v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 219
Ga. App. 899, 466 S.E.2d 923 (1996).
325. 256 Ga. App. at 870, 569 S.E.2d at 65 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 244
Ga. App. 338, 340, 535 S.E.2d 511, 512 (2000)).
326. Id. at 871, 569 S.E.2d at 65.
327. Id.
328. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 66.
329. Id. at 872, 569 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting Duncan v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 267 Ga.
646, 647, 482 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1997)).
330. Id. at 873, 570 S.E.2d at 66.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 874, 570 S.E.2d at 67.
334. 256 Ga. App. 191, 568 S.E.2d 113 (2002).
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the employee-plaintiff's request to intervene. David Payne was injured
on March 21, 1995, and was paid workers' compensation benefits by his
employer, Dundee Mills, Inc. On March 21, 1997, Dundee Mills filed
suit against P. F. Moon & Company and Lockwood Greene Engineers,
Inc., to recover disability benefits it paid for Payne. David Payne and
his wife, Elizabeth Payne, moved to intervene on August 21, 1997, and
filed a proposed complaint. Dundee Mills dismissed its claims on
September 12, 1997. 3 "5 The trial court then denied the Paynes' motion
in the court of
to intervene, and an appeal followed,"'6 which resulted
33 7
appeals allowing the Paynes' complaint to proceed.
The Paynes filed a new complaint on October 5, 1999. Their new
complaint was essentially the same as their first complaint, seeking
damages for pain and suffering and a loss of consortium claim by
Elizabeth Payne. Moon filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative,
a motion for partial summary judgment, which was denied by the trial
court. 38 On an interlocutory appeal, Moon argued that "(1) pain and
suffering [was] an element of damages not included in Dundee [Mills's]
original complaint, and that David Payne [was] impermissibly attempting to inject a new issue into the existing litigation, and (2) Elizabeth
Payne's claim for loss of consortium was filed outside the four-year
statute of limitations." 9
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings on both issues,
a decision that was certainly favorable to the employee.34 ° On the first
issue, the court noted that even though the employer or insurer could
sue in its own name, the cause of action was the employee's. 34 ' Section
34-9-11.1 contemplates that the employer may receive a judgment for
more than its subrogation lien, and the excess would have to be paid to
the employee. 342 By that same token, the statute would contemplate
allowing the employer to assert a cause of action for the employee's pain
and suffering. 34 The court stated, had "Dundee Mills ...remained in
the litigation, it could have amended its complaint to add a timely claim
for David Payne's pain and suffering."344 However, by the time the
Paynes' right to intervention had been addressed, Dundee Mills had

335.
336.
337.
338.
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340.
341.
342.
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Id. at 191, 568 S.E.2d at 114.
Id.; see Payne v. Dundee Mills, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 514, 510 S.E.2d 67 (1998).
256 Ga. App. at 191, 568 S.E.2d at 114.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 115.
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Id. at 194, 568 S.E.2d at 117.
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dismissed its own claim with prejudice. 45 The court then had to
determine whether the Paynes, as intervenors, could stand in Dundee
Mills's shoes for purposes of amerding the complaint to seek pain and
suffering. 46
The court determined that the Paynes were simply
seeking to add an additional element of damages arising out of the same
occurrence and that under those circumstances, their claim could be
treated as an amendment by a party plaintiff relating back to the date
of the original complaint for statute of limitation purposes.347
The court made a point of stating that this holding "furthers the intent
of [O.C.G.A. section] 34-9-11.1 [because] [an employer is often in a
better position to identify those third parties who bear some responsibility for the employee's injuries. "34 When an employer waits until the
last minute to file the suit, the employee "may be left without any
opportunity to assert his own independent claims. The statute allows
the employee to intervene to protect his interests, and [the] holding here
ensures that he is able to pursue all relief arising from his own cause of
action."' 9
As for the second issue, the loss of consortium claim, the court
determined that it was also allowed."' If the 1997 claim would have
been allowed, it would have been filed well before the expiration of the
four-year statute of limitationss.35 ' Thus, the employee's claims were
allowed to proceed, even though he did not file the original suit, many
years had passed since the original incident, and the employer and
workers' compensation carrier dismissed their claims some four or five
years earlier.35

345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. "Anamendment to a complaint relates back to the original filing date if it asks
for additional damages which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject of the initial complaint." Id. (citing Pardue Constr. Co. v. City of Toccoa, 147 Ga.
App. 132, 248 S.E.2d 199 (1978); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (1993 & Supp. 2003)).
348. Id. at 194, 568 S.E.2d at 116.
349. Id.
350. Id., 568 S.E.2d at 117.
351. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1993 & Supp. 2003). See also Epps v. Hin, 255 Ga.
App. 370, 371, 565 S.E.2d 577, 578 (2002), which states, "[t]he running of the limitation
period on a personal injury claim does not bar a derivative claim for loss of consortium."
352. 256 Ga. App. at 194, 568 S.E.2d at 117.
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